NAFTA and the geography of North American trade by Howard J. Wall
NAFTA and the Geography of North American
Trade
Howard J. Wall
MARCH/APRIL 2003      13
T
his paper estimates the effects of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
on the geographic pattern of North American
trade. Specifically, it looks at the effects of NAFTA
on aggregate trade flows between subnational
regions within North America and between North
American regions and the non-NAFTA world. The
importance of a regional analysis of the effects of
NAFTA is evident from the variety of regional
post-NAFTA experiences. Between 1993 and 1997,
real trade between Canada and the United States
increased by more than 50 percent. Over the same
period, Central Canadian exports to the Southwest
and Rocky Mountain regions of the United States
and Eastern Canadian exports to the Southeast of
the United States all increased by more than 110
percent. In contrast, Eastern Canadian real imports
from the Great Lakes, Plains, and Southeast regions
of the United States were actually lower in 1997
than they were in 1993. Further, although real
Canadian exports to Mexico increased by 46 percent
over the period, those from Western Canada rose
by over 90 percent while those from Eastern Canada
rose by less than 1 percent.1
Viner (1950) established the general principle
that the welfare effect of joining a preferential
trading area (PTA) such as NAFTA is ambiguous. This
is because PTAs create a distortion between the
trading conditions that member and nonmember
countries face. In a simple partial-equilibrium model
under perfect competition, a PTA will increase trade
between members, whether countries or regions,
because the tariff between them has been eliminated
(trade creation). If the most efficient producer of a
good is outside the PTA, the effect is to import more
from the less efficient member-producer (trade
diversion). The net effect of a PTA on trade volume
(as a proxy for welfare) would depend, therefore, on
the relative sizes of trade creation and trade diversion. 
Despite the presumed certainty of trade creation
and trade diversion, the ways in which integration
affects trade are many and varied, and few fit into
the simple Vinerian dichotomy. One significant non-
Vinerian way for integration to affect trade volumes
is through increasing returns to scale, a topic typi-
cally absent from the empirical literature, although
prominent in the theoretical literature. It has also
been central to the public discussion of North
American integration, as, for example, Canadian
firms have long argued that access to the U.S. market
would allow them to exploit economies of scale.
This access would allow them to increase their
exports not only to the rest of North America, but
also to the rest of the world. Increasing returns also
affects the volume of trade in inputs and interme-
diate goods used by increasing-returns industries.
This is because firms that expand production and
exploit economies of scale need to purchase more
inputs and intermediate products, which might be
imported from inside or outside North America.
Thus, in contrast with the Vinerian effects, with
economies of scale, NAFTA may increase trade
between members and between members and
nonmembers.
The effects from trade creation, trade diversion,
and scale economies arise whether one looks at
trade from a national or a regional standpoint, and
they would drive much of the regional variation in
the effects of a PTA. As with countries, regions differ
in their abilities to match their comparative advan-
tages to the preferences of consumers in other mem-
ber and nonmember regions. However, the recent
literature under the rubric of the “new economic
geography” suggests that things are actually much
more interesting when account is taken of firms
changing their locations as a response to joining a
PTA. This literature, spearheaded by Krugman
1 See Tables A1 through A4 in Appendix A for the available percent
differences in real region-to-region, region-to-country, and country-to-
country trade between 1993 and 1997. See also Krueger (2000) for a
broader discussion of the changes in trade between NAFTA partners.
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© 2003, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.(1991a,b), models various ways in which production
patterns (and therefore trade patterns) can change
with integration because of its effects on firms’
optimal location decisions.2
One of the reasons that a PTA affects geographic
trade patterns is that it alters the spatial distributions
of firms’ customers and suppliers. For example,
consider a firm initially located in Massachusetts.
By adding Mexico to the Canada–United States Free
Trade Area, the spatial distributions of the firm’s
customers and suppliers are shifted southward,
creating greater incentive for the firm to move closer
to Mexico, if not into Mexico itself. If the firm relo-
cates, regional trade patterns will change because
goods that were exported from Massachusetts to
Canada, Mexico, and the rest of the world would
instead be exported from, say, Arizona. At the same
time, because the firm has moved across the conti-
nent, it is in a better position for exporting to Asia
and a worse position for exporting to Europe. Also,
the firm would be more likely to import intermedi-
ate products from Asia, and the regional import
pattern would change accordingly.
A second reason that a PTA affects geographic
trade patterns is that it expands the set of possible
places for firms to locate. Under NAFTA, Canadian
and U.S. firms that move to Mexico can do so with-
out losing tariff-free access to their domestic markets.
This affects intra-NAFTA trade by switching what
had been exports, say, from Canada to the United
States and Mexico, into exports from Mexico to the
United States and Canada. Extra-NAFTA trade would
also be affected, as a firm that was exporting from
Canada to the rest of the world would instead export
from Mexico. The new economic geography litera-
ture suggests that these location effects are much
stronger when there are cross-firm linkages whereby
a firm’s marginal costs are lower when other firms
are nearby. With these linkages there is a tendency
for linked firms to cluster, creating industry centers. 
These examples are by no means exhaustive,
but they do provide sufficient illustration of the
theoretical inadequacies of the Vinerian dichotomy.
In this vein, my estimates of the regional effects of
NAFTA serve a more general purpose. Specifically,
they provide support for the hypothesis that, because
it does not account for the spatial or geographic
effects of integration, standard customs union theory
(the Vinerian dichotomy) is inadequate for capturing
the effects of preferential trading areas. The geo-
graphic approach is a break from standard empirical
analyses of PTAs in that it recognizes that the nation
is not always the relevant unit of reference for inter-
national trade (Krugman, 1991a). I find ample evi-
dence that the effects of NAFTA have not conformed
to the Vinerian dichotomy and conclude that the
customs union theory needs to be reworked to
include a substantial accounting of geography and
scale economies. 
The empirical model that I use, the gravity
model, has become the workhorse for estimating
the effects of PTAs on trade volume. In a gravity
model, bilateral trade is assumed to be an increasing
function of the national incomes of the trading
partners and a decreasing function of the distance
between them. The effects of PTAs are modeled with
dummy variables. For my present purposes, the
gravity model has advantages and disadvantages,
both arising from its simplicity. While it allows me
to examine the effects of NAFTA on a large number
of trading combinations, it is not versatile enough
to attribute the effects on aggregate trade to trade
creation, trade diversion, the mobility of firms,
agglomeration, etc.
From a practical standpoint, the major advan-
tage of the gravity model is that the researcher does
not need to specify the underlying trade processes,
although that it is largely ad hoc has meant that the
gravity model has met with much suspicion by
international trade theorists. Deardorff (1984, p. 504),
however, concluded that gravity models tell us
“something very important about what happens in
international trade, even if they do not tell us why.”
Recently, though, the gravity model has “gone from
an embarrassing poverty of theoretical foundations
to an embarrassment of riches.”3 In fact, as shown
by Bergstrand (1985, 1989) and Deardorff (1998),
among others, the gravity model can be derived
within a variety of standard theoretical frameworks.
The estimates I present below demonstrate vividly
the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the gravity
model. On the one hand, its simplicity allows for
the estimation of a large number of region-to-region
NAFTA effects that would be extremely difficult to
obtain using any other method. On the other hand,
it provides little guidance to explain why the NAFTA
effects occur. Nevertheless, the results do suggest that
geography may have played an extremely large role.
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2 Also see Krugman (1998) and Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999).
Hanson (1996, 1998a, 1998b) and Krugman and Hanson (1994) discuss
the effects that previous stages of North American integration have
had on location decisions. Two recent gravity studies also look at the effects
of NAFTA on aggregate trade between NAFTA mem-
bers, both using national-level data only. Krueger
(1999) found that NAFTA has had no statistically
significant effect on intra-North American trade,
although she did find a statistically significant
decrease in imports from Europe. Gould (1998),
who only considered intra-North American trade,
found that NAFTA has had a significant effect on
trade between the United States and Mexico, but not
on trade between the United States and Canada or
Mexico and Canada.4One reason for these lukewarm
results is the small number of observations of post-
NAFTA national-level trade volume. As will be appar-
ent below, this is not a problem in the present study.
THE DATA
In constructing my empirical model, many of
the choices are driven by the availability of data on
North American regional trade. This study is based
on a unique dataset from Statistics Canada on provin-
cial merchandise imports and exports to and from
all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and most
countries of the world. It is the same dataset that
formed the basis of earlier studies of the effect of the
United States–Canada border on trade (McCallum,
1995, Helliwell, 1996). However, because I do not
wish to consider the additional complication of the
border effect, I do not include data on intraprovin-
cial trade. 
My dataset includes bilateral provincial trade
between all provinces and the 50 U.S. states, the
District of Columbia, Mexico, and 8 non-NAFTA
countries: China, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom. I also include data from World Trade
Flows on bilateral trade between the non-NAFTA
countries.5 The data on trade between non-NAFTA
countries are needed as a control under the assump-
tion that trade between them has not been affected
by NAFTA.6
The two data shortcomings are the absence of
comparable state-level data on U.S. merchandise
trade with countries other than Canada and the
absence of Mexican state-level data of any sort.7
Nonetheless, the dataset is extremely rich, providing
a panel of 1272 bilateral trading pairs, with 11,340
observations.8 Note that all values in the dataset
are transformed into real 1992 Canadian dollars at
market exchange rates.9 I use market exchange rates
rather than purchasing-power-parity exchange rates
to reflect the fact that what matters for international
trade is the size of a country’s economy at world
prices, rather than domestic prices. Thus, in the
spirit of gravity models, fluctuations in the value of
a country’s currency are captured by fluctuations
in its economic size.
In principle, I could estimate the model with
every state, province, and non-NAFTA country as
its own region. However, I need to collect the states
and provinces into regions to yield enough obser-
vations to provide reliable estimates of the regional
NAFTA dummies. Thus, using standard regional
designations from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis and Statistics Canada, I divide North America
into 13 regions. Three are in Canada (Eastern, Central,
and Western Canada), nine are in the United States
(New England, Mideast, Great Lakes, Plains, South-
east, South Central, Southwest, Rocky Mountain,
Far West), and Mexico is treated as one region.10 I
also divide the 8 non-NAFTA countries into two
regions: Asia and Europe. So, although my model
allows for the effects of NAFTA to differ across
regions, the estimated effects of NAFTA are assumed
to be uniform across the locations (states, provinces,
or countries) within a region. 
Given the dataset, there are 39 pairs of regions.
Because I have data for both directions of trade for
all 39 pairs, there are 78 unidirectional trading
pairs—60 for intra-NAFTA trade, 8 for imports into
North America, 8 for exports from North America,
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7 The United States does collect state-level export data, but it is not
compatible with the Canadian data. See Coughlin and Wall (2003) for
an analysis of NAFTA and U.S. state exports.
8 Of the 1272 pairs, 1020 are for trade between U.S. states and Canadian
provinces (51 states, 10 provinces, 2 directions of trade), 20 are for
trade between Mexico and the Canadian provinces, 16 are for trade
between Mexico and the 8 non-NAFTA countries, 160 are for trade
between the Canadian provinces and the non-NAFTA countries, and
56 are for trade between the non-NAFTA countries.
9 See the data appendix for details about data sources.
10 See the data appendix for the assignment of states, provinces, and
countries to regions. 
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4 For estimates of the industry-level partial-equilibrium effects, see
Krueger (1999), Busse (1996), Devadoss, Kropf, and Wahl (1995),
Espinosa and Noyola (1997), Hinojosa-Ojeda et al. (1996), Karemera
and Ojah (1998), USITC (1997), and Wylie (1995). Also, see the volume
edited by Kehoe and Kehoe (1995) for applied general-equilibrium
estimates.
5 See Feenstra (2000) and Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997) for
descriptions of this dataset.
6 Of course, in the most general of general-equilibrium models, NAFTA
also would affect trade between any two non-NAFTA countries. None-
theless, these effects are small enough to ignore for present purposes.and 2 for trade between Asia and Europe. To esti-
mate these interregional effects, I include region-
pair dummy variables for all 76 of the region pairs
that include at least one North American region. 
ESTIMATION
I estimate bilateral trade with a gravity equation
specifying the level of exports from location i to
location j as a function of their gross domestic
products (GDPs), the distance between them, and
any number of fixed cultural and geographic mea-
sures such as language and contiguity. Departing
somewhat from the standard gravity model, I do
not impose the restriction that the intercepts be
the same across pairs of locations and directions of
trade. This follows Mátyás (1997), Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1997), Cheng and Wall (2002), Glick
and Rose (2001), Pakko and Wall (2001), and Egger
(2002) who argue that gravity models that restrict
the intercepts to equality suffer from heterogeneity
bias. 





where xijtis real exports from location i to location j
in year t, α0 is the shared intercept, αij is the trading-
pair intercept (without the restriction that αij=αji), λt
is the shared time trend, distij is the distance between
i and j, and Yit and Yjt are the real GDPs of i and j.11
IntraNA is a 60 × 1 vector of dummy variables
to capture the effects of NAFTA on both directions
of trade between the 30 region-to-region combina-
tions within North America. An element of IntraNA
takes the value of one when the observation is of
post-NAFTA trade from the element’s exporting
region to its importing region and is zero otherwise.
Similarly, NAImp is the 8 × 1 vector of dummy
variables to capture the effects of NAFTA on North
American regional imports from Asia and Europe,
and NAExp is the 8 × 1 vector of dummy variables
to capture the effects of NAFTA on North American
regional exports to Europe and Asia. 
Because the four European countries in the
sample are also members of the European Union
(EU), the regression equation also includes dummy
variables to control for the transformation of the
European Community (EC) into the EU in 1993.
Specifically, EU is a vector of three dummy variables
for post-EU trade: one each for trade between mem-
bers, trade from a nonmember to a member, and
trade from a member to a nonmember. Note that,
because the model has trading-pair intercepts and
because the four European countries in the dataset
were all members of the EC at the start of the sample
period, the EU dummy variables account only for
the differences between the two regimes. The effect
of the EC is already accounted for by the relevant
trading-pair intercepts.
The least-squares estimates are provided in
Tables 1 and 2A. Distance and other standard vari-
ables in gravity models, such as contiguity and
common language, cannot be estimated separately
because they are all fixed over time. Because of this,
they are subsumed into the trading-pair intercept,
along with all other observable and unobservable
fixed factors related to history, culture, preferences,
etc., that would make exports from i to j differ from
trade between other trading pairs.
The results in Table 1 are as expected for a
gravity equation: The higher the incomes of the two
partners are, the more they trade. Of the three EU
dummies, only the one for the effect of the EU on
EU exports to the rest of the world is statistically
significant. It suggests that the change in regime
from the EC to the EU increased EU exports to non-
members by 7.8 percent (100 × (e
7.5–1)). In contrast,
the estimated coefficients on the other two EU dum-
mies suggest that the EU had little effect on intra-EU
trade or on EU imports from nonmembers. Keep in
mind, though, that because the sample is extremely
limited in its coverage of European trade, these
results are far from definitive. The coefficient on
the time trend is positive, indicating a common trend
toward more trade, even without NAFTA, although
it is statistically insignificant.
My primary interest is in the signs and levels
of the estimated coefficients on the interregional
NAFTA dummies, which are listed in Table 2A and
converted into percentage changes in Table 2B. In
addition, Tables 3 and 4 provide various aggrega-
tions of the interregional percentage changes,
which are obtained by applying the estimated per-
centage changes to the average real post-NAFTA
trade volumes for 1994-98. 
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11 Note that because some observations are of zero trade, the dependent
variable is the log of 1 plus exports. Having censored data normally
requires Tobit estimation, but for gravity models this has typically
made little difference (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998).TRADE BETWEEN NORTH AMERICAN
REGIONS
Canada—United States Trade
According to my results as summarized in
Table 3A, NAFTA increased Canadian exports to the
United States by 29 percent and Canadian imports
from the United States by 14 percent. From the
perspective of the three Canadian regions, positive
NAFTA effects were far from universal. As shown in
Tables 2A and B, all 18 of the estimated effects of
NAFTA on trade between Eastern Canada and a U.S.
region are negative, and all but one are statistically
significant. In total, the results indicate that Eastern
Canadian exports to the United States were 9 percent
lower because of NAFTA, with the largest decreases
being to the Rocky Mountain and Plains regions.
Similarly, Eastern Canadian imports from the United
States fell by 13 percent, with imports from all U.S.
regions seeing roughly similar decreases. 
In stark contrast with the results for Eastern
Canada, the results for Central Canada indicated
that NAFTA led to large increases in trade with the
United States. They suggest that total Central
Canadian exports to the United States rose by 43
percent because of NAFTA, with all but one U.S.
region seeing a large increase. On the import side,
NAFTA increased Central Canadian imports from
the United States by 18 percent. Although the effects
on imports from the Rocky Mountain region and
the Far West were small and statistically insignifi-
cant, the effects on imports from the other seven
regions were all positive.
The mixed region-to-region effects for Western
Canada mean that the estimated effect of NAFTA
on the region’s total trade with the United States
was effectively zero. Nonetheless, there were large
differences across U.S. regions in the estimated
effects of NAFTA on Western Canada’s trade. The
one positive and statistically significant effect was
to the Great Lakes region. The four negative and
statistically significant effects were for exports to
the Northeast, Mideast, Southeast, and South Central
regions. For Western Canadian imports from the
United States, only the estimated effect on imports
from the Great Lakes region was positive and statis-
tically significant. The four regions with negative
and statistically significant effects were the North-
east, South Central, Rocky Mountain, and Far West
regions.
Table 3B provides the region-to-region effects
aggregated across the three Canadian regions for
each of the U.S. regions. From this perspective, it
is easy to see that the estimated positive effect of
NAFTA on trade between Canada and the United
States was fairly general across U.S. regions. Excep-
tions to this were the Rocky Mountain region, with
an estimated 6 percent fall in exports to Canada
with no change in imports, and the Far West, with
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Regression Results, Dependent Variable = ln(1+Exports)
Model with heterogeneous interregional NAFTA effects
Coefficient* Robust s.e.† t statistic
Shared intercept (α 0) –5.024 –0.330 15.205
Log of origin GDP (β) 0.368 0.032 11.544
Log of destination GDP (γ) 0.507 0.032 15.872
Trend (λ) 0.002 0.002 1.203
EU and intra-EU trade (µ1) 0.009 0.021 0.438
EU and EU imports (µ2) 0.013 0.025 0.512
EU and EU exports (µ3) 0.075 0.025 3.080
IntraNA, NAImp, NAExp (δ,θ,ρ) See Table 2
11340 observations, R
–2 = 0.981, F(82,9986) = 66.79
NOTE: The 1272 bilateral region-pair intercepts are suppressed for space considerations.





























Coefficients on Region-to-Region NAFTA Dummies
Origin/ Eastern Central  Western  New  Mid- Great  South- South  South- Rocky  Far 
destination Canada Canada Canada England east Lakes Plains east Central west Mountain West Mexico Europe Asia
Eastern Canada –0.115 –0.034 –0.051 –0.193 –0.106 –0.157 –0.094 –0.224 –0.164 –0.159 –0.179 –0.174
0.022 0.026 0.020 0.011 0.019 0.015 0.035 0.013 0.013 0.035 0.030 0.025
Central Canada 0.367 0.204 0.438 0.206 0.467 0.402 0.316 –0.088 0.275 –0.006 –0.137 –0.032
0.050 0.034 0.042 0.033 0.039 0.042 0.050 0.090 0.061 0.074 0.042 0.054
Western Canada –0.121 –0.075 0.085 0.015 –0.092 –0.077 –0.015 0.052 0.017 0.269 –0.060 –0.107
0.019 0.031 0.040 0.041 0.017 0.021 0.030 0.034 0.022 0.052 0.032 0.034
New England –0.129 0.155 –0.144
0.010 0.017 0.012
Mideast –0.116 0.108 –0.012
0.011 0.043 0.018
Great Lakes –0.139 0.229 0.110
0.014 0.040 0.024
Plains –0.158 0.082 0.023
0.010 0.034 0.020
Southeast –0.157 0.200 –0.034
0.013 0.033 0.018
South Central –0.137 0.245 –0.038
0.011 0.033 0.015
Southwest –0.161 0.093 –0.007
0.014 0.040 0.022
Rocky Mountain –0.180 –0.022 –0.115
0.011 0.036 0.015
Far West –0.157 0.023 –0.062
0.013 0.030 0.016
Mexico –0.132 0.416 0.231 0.001 0.134
0.056 0.098 0.064 0.097 0.101
Europe –0.137 0.067 –0.137 –0.079
0.035 0.037 0.045 0.079
Asia –0.179 0.028 –0.146 0.106
0.030 0.046 0.028 0.073
























































Percentage Changes in Region-to-Region Trade Due to NAFTA
Origin/ Eastern Central  Western New  Mid- Great  South- South  South- Rocky  Far 
destination Canada Canada Canada England east Lakes Plains east Central west Mountain West Mexico Europe Asia
Eastern Canada –10.9 –3.3 –5.0 –17.6 –10.1 –14.5 –9.0 –20.1 –15.1 –14.7 –16.4 –16.0
Central Canada 44.3 22.6 55.0 22.9 59.5 49.5 37.2 –8.4 31.7 –0.6 –12.8 –3.1
Western Canada –11.4 –7.2 8.9 1.5 –8.8 –7.4 –1.5 5.3 1.7 30.9 –5.8 –10.1
New England –12.1 16.8 –13.4
Mideast –11.0 11.4 –1.2
Great Lakes –13.0 25.7 11.6
Plains –14.6 8.5 2.3
Southeast –14.5 22.1 –3.3
South Central –12.8 27.8 –3.7
Southwest –14.9 9.7 –0.7
Rocky Mountain –16.5 –2.2 –10.9
Far West –14.5 2.3 –6.0
Mexico –12.4 51.6 26.0 0.1 14.3
Europe –12.8 6.9 –12.8 –7.6
Asia –16.4 2.8 –13.6 11.2
NOTE: Bold indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
Table 2Ban even smaller estimated drop in exports to Canada.
The results also indicate that the Great Lakes and
South Central regions saw the largest increases in
exports to Canada, while the largest increases in
imports from Canada were for the Great Lakes and
Southeast regions. 
Canada-Mexico Trade
As reported in Table 3C, according to the model,
NAFTA had a large effect on trade between Mexico
and Canada, with significant regional variation. It
suggests that, for Canada as a whole, NAFTA in-
creased exports to Mexico by 12 percent and imports
from Mexico by 48 percent. However, Eastern Canada
saw its exports to and imports from Mexico drop by
15 and 12 percent, respectively, whereas Western
Canada saw increases of 31 and 26 percent, respec-
tively. For Central Canada, NAFTA had no effect on
exports to Mexico, while it increased imports from
Mexico by 52 percent.
Trade Creation?
As discussed in the introduction, according to the
Vinerian dichotomy, NAFTA should have increased
the volume of trade between its members, whether
these members are countries or regions. Although
my results indicate that trade creation held at the
country-to-country level, this was far from universal
for region-to-region or region-to-country trade. Of
the 60 coefficients on intra-NAFTA region-to-region
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Aggregated Effects of NAFTA on Intra-NAFTA Trade (Percent)
A. Canada–United States by Canadian Regions
Region Exports to United States Imports from United States
Eastern Canada –8.8 –13.1
Central Canada 42.8 18.3
Western Canada 0.9 –0.5
Canada total 29.2 14.3
B. Canada–United States by U.S. Regions
Region Exports to Canada Imports from Canada
New England 12.8 25.9
Mideast 9.9 16.7
Great Lakes 23.9 47.1
Plains 6.2 9.3
Southeast 17.1 40.9
South Central 21.7 27.9
Southwest 6.4 18.1
Rocky Mountain –5.8 0.6
Far West –1.7 14.4
U.S. total 14.3 29.2
C. Canada-Mexico by Canadian Regions
Region Exports to Mexico Imports from Mexico
Eastern Canada –14.7 –12.4
Central Canada –0.6 51.6
Western Canada 30.9 26.0
Canada total 11.5 48.2
Table 3trade, 27 indicate statistically significant decreases
in interregional trade because of NAFTA, with 21 of
them associated with Eastern Canadian trade. Aggre-
gating the region-to-region effects to the region-to-
country level, negative trade effects also arise: The
estimated effect on both directions of Eastern
Canada’s trade with the United States and Mexico
are negative and large. Finally, when the regional
effects are aggregated to the country-to-country
level, all results have NAFTA leading to an increase
in intra-NAFTA trade.
TRADE WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD
Canada
As reported in Tables 4A and B, the estimated
effects of NAFTA on Canada’s regional exports to
Europe and Asia were, for the most part, consistent
with the Vinerian prediction of trade diversion.
NAFTA’s estimated effects on total Canadian exports
to Europe and Asia were decreases of 12 and 9 per-
cent, respectively. Although the magnitude of these
effects differed across Canadian regions, the esti-
mated effect on exports to both Asia and Europe
were negative for all regions. For both continents,
Eastern Canada experienced the largest drops in
exports (greater than 16 percent), whereas Western
Canada had the smallest drop in exports to Europe
(6 percent), and Central Canada had the smallest
drop in exports to Asia (3 percent).
On the import side, the estimated effect of
NAFTA on total Canadian imports from Europe was
an increase of less than 2 percent, whereas its esti-
mated effect on imports from Asia was a decrease
of 3 percent. At the regional level, the results indicate
that Eastern and Western Canada both had large
decreases in imports from both Europe and Asia,
whereas Central Canada saw small and statistically
insignificant increases in imports from both conti-
nents. So, although the estimated effects of NAFTA
on total Canadian imports from each of Asia and
Europe were effectively zero, the real story is at the
regional level. Consistent with Vinerian trade diver-
sion, the indication is that Eastern and Western
Canada both experienced large decreases in imports
from Europe and Asia.
Mexico
As reported in Tables 4A and B, the estimated
effects of NAFTA on Mexico’s exports to the rest of
the world were mixed. According to the model,
exports to Europe were unaffected by NAFTA, where-
as exports to Asia were 14 percent higher. As for
Mexican imports, the model suggests that NAFTA
led to an 8 percent drop in imports from Europe,
whereas it led to an 11 percent increase in imports
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Aggregated Effects of NAFTA on Extra-NAFTA Trade (Percent)
A. Europe
Region Exports to Europe Imports from Europe
Eastern Canada –16.4 –12.8
Central Canada –12.8 6.9
Western Canada –5.8 –12.8
Canada total –11.7 1.7
Mexico 0.1 –7.6
B. Asia
Region Exports to Asia Imports from Asia
Eastern Canada –16.0 –16.4
Central Canada –3.1 2.8
Western Canada –10.1 13.6
Canada total –8.9 –3.0
Mexico 14.3 11.2
Table 4from Asia. Note, though, that none of these estimated
effects of NAFTA on Mexican trade with Europe and
Asia is statistically significant at traditional levels.
Trade Diversion?
At the national and regional levels, the effects
of NAFTA on Canada’s and Mexico’s trade with the
non-NAFTA world strongly suggests that there has
been more going on than simple trade diversion.
Although most of the results for Canadian trade are
consistent with trade diversion, the story is different
for Mexico. In particular, the results indicate that
NAFTA has increased the volume of trade with Asia,
although the estimated effect on exports and imports
are statistically significant at only the 18 and 15
percent levels, respectively. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
According to my results, the effects of NAFTA
on the volume and pattern of North American trade
have been significant (statistically and otherwise).
Specifically, the results indicate that, because of
NAFTA, 29 percent more merchandise flowed from
Canada to the United States and 14 percent more
merchandise flowed from the United States to
Canada. Thus, about one-half of the increase in
Canadian exports to the United States between
1993 and 1997 is attributed to NAFTA, while about
one-quarter of the increase in Canadian imports
from the United States over the period is attributed
to NAFTA. The results indicate also that NAFTA
increased the flow of merchandise from Canada to
Mexico by 12 percent and increased the flow from
Mexico to Canada by 48 percent. Thus, NAFTA was
responsible for about one-quarter of the increase
in Canadian exports to Mexico between 1993 and
1997 and roughly 60 percent of the increase in
Canadian imports from Mexico over the period. 
The volume and pattern of North American
trade with Europe and Asia also changed in the
wake of NAFTA. Specifically, NAFTA led to large
decreases in Canada’s exports to Europe and Asia,
a decrease in Mexican imports from Europe, and a
large increase in Mexican trade with Asia.
The geographical approach reveals interesting
regional differences in the effects of NAFTA. For
Eastern Canada, NAFTA led to large decreases in
trade with the United States, Mexico, Asia, and
Europe. For Central Canada, NAFTA led to large
increases in trade with the rest of North America
and a large decrease in exports to Europe. For
Western Canada, NAFTA had no effect on total
trade with the United States, but it did lead to large
increases in trade with Mexico and decreases in
trade with Europe and Asia. For U.S. regions, the
increases in trade were spread widely, with the Rocky
Mountain and Far West regions as exceptions.
According to the Vinerian dichotomy, NAFTA
should have increased trade between North American
regions and decreased trade between each North
American region and the rest of the world. Although
the gravity methodology is not adequate for separat-
ing Vinerian effects from geographic effects, it has
provided sufficient evidence that there is more to
North American integration than trade creation and
diversion. The most significant exceptions to the
Vinerian dichotomy were as follows: (i) decreased
trade between Eastern Canada and all U.S. regions
and Mexico, (ii) decreased trade between Western
Canada and some U.S. regions, and (iii) increased
trade between Mexico and Asia. 
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Province-to-state and province-to-country trade data, 1990-98, from Statistics Canada.
Non-Canadian country-to-country trade, 1990-97, from World Trade Flows, 1980-1997.
Nominal gross provincial product, 1990-98, from Statistics Canada.
Nominal gross state product, 1990-98, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Nominal gross domestic product, 1990-98, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 1999.
All variables were converted into real Canadian dollars using the Canadian consumer price index (CPI) and
$/C$ market exchange rates from Statistics Canada. 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE REGIONS
The nine U.S. regions are based on the eight Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions, with the BEA
Southeast region split into two: Southeast and South Central. The three Canadian regions are according
to Statistics Canada. The eight countries assigned to the Asia and Europe regions are taken from Canada’s
ten most important trading partners, the other two being the United States and Taiwan. Taiwan could not
be included because the World Bank does not provide its GDP data.
Eastern Canada:  New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island
Central Canada:  Ontario and Quebec
Western Canada:  Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan
New England:  Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont
Mideast:  Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania
Great Lakes:  Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin
Plains:  Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota
Southeast:  Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia
South Central:  Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee
Southwest:  Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas
Rocky Mountain: Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming
Far West:  Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington
Mexico: Mexico
Asia:  China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea























































Percentage Changes in Real Region-to-Region International Trade, 1993-97
Origin/ Eastern Central  Western New  Mid- Great  South- South  South- Rocky  Far 
destination Canada Canada Canada England east Lakes Plains east Central west Mountain West Mexico Europe Asia
Eastern Canada 37.7 62.0 71.0 33.3 130.8 12.0 104.2 –4.8 3.6 0.9 11.5 38.0
Central Canada 69.2 41.0 48.6 79.6 86.4 80.2 110.5 160.3 101.2 21.7 9.7 69.4
Western Canada 81.2 36.6 48.7 59.7 53.3 71.0 125.8 82.9 42.6 90.7 35.3 27.6
New England 40.7 45.8 50.8
Mideast 14.3 50.7 48.3
Great Lakes –15.7 41.6 33.2
Plains –47.9 84.0 60.5
Southeast –4.2 63.8 63.3
South Central 78.7 87.6 62.8
Southwest 39.4 95.9 87.2
Rocky Mountain –39.9 46.2 39.1
Far West 22.8 53.3 51.2
Mexico 26.0 69.2 219.1 58.0 70.0
Europe 45.7 49.4 109.5 22.3
Asia 23.0 28.9 20.2 15.1
NOTE: Values are the percentage differences in trade between 1997 and 1993, measured in 1992 Canadian dollars at market exchange rates.
Table A1
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Canada–United States by Canadian Regions
Exports to  Imports from 
Region United States United States
Eastern Canada 56.7 11.4
Central Canada 58.4 53.7
Western Canada 55.0 51.9
Canada total 57.6 52.7
Table A2
Canada–United States by U.S. Regions
Exports to  Imports from 
Region Canada Canada
New England 45.9 63.0
Mideast 49.9 41.3
Great Lakes 40.3 48.8
Plains 74.0 67.2
Southeast 61.2 83.5
South Central 83.8 75.4
Southwest 92.5 114.0
Rocky Mountain 43.2 99.0
Far West 52.0 66.9
U.S. total 52.7 57.6
Table A3
Canada–Mexico, Europe, and Asia
Canadian Exports Canadian Imports
Mexico 45.6 77.7
Europe 14.6 55.7
Asia 36.4 25.9
Table A4